Police reform – here we go again
- Andy Oldham
- Jan 26
- 4 min read
After not quite five months in post, Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood has unveiled a white paper setting out the government’s plans to reform policing. On paper, at least, the proposals are radical.
The headlines include:
Bringing together existing national agencies and specialist capabilities – the National Crime Agency, Counter Terrorism Policing, regional organised crime units, police air support, national roads policing and a new national forensics team – into a single organisation.
Creating this new body, currently labelled the National Police Service (NPS) but already and inevitably dubbed “Britain’s FBI” (as SOCA and the NCA were before), headed by a national police commissioner who would become the most senior police officer in the country.
Giving the NPS responsibility for national training standards (quite what this means for the College of Policing – which so far hasn’t featured prominently in the announcements – remains to be seen).
Establishing a new National Public Order Commander within the NPS to co‑ordinate the police response to large‑scale disorder, such as the riots of 2011 and 2024.
Reducing the number of police forces in England and Wales from 43 to somewhere between 10 and 20.
Giving the Home Secretary the power to dismiss underperforming chief constables – a power that currently rests only with Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs).
Focusing recruitment on university graduates and reinstating the direct entry route for inspectors (currently paused) to attract people with broader management experience into policing.
Requiring all police officers to obtain and maintain a professional “licence” through regular training, mirroring the medical profession. Failure to meet the licence requirements could ultimately lead to dismissal.
Refocusing local policing on so‑called “volume” crime – shoplifting, burglary, low‑level public order and similar everyday offences.
Taken together, these proposals represent the biggest shake‑up of policing for generations, arguably since Robert Peel established modern policing in the 1830s.
There are lots of unanswered questions, such as what happens to existing national forces like the British Transport Police and Civil Nuclear Constabulary – do they get folded into the NPS as well?
Some of these changes are, in my view, long overdue. In this post, though, I want to focus on perhaps the most significant: cutting the number of police forces.
Too many forces, too much duplication
We currently have 43 forces in England and Wales, ranging widely in size. At one end is the City of London Police with roughly 1,000 officers; at the other is the Metropolitan Police, which surrounds the City and has around 34,000 officers. Each force has its own chief constable (or commissioner, in the case of the Met and City of London) and a senior leadership team whose responsibilities often resemble running a medium‑sized business more than fighting crime.
Alongside those leadership structures sit control rooms, HR departments, finance teams, press offices, social media teams (essential these days), IT departments, vehicle workshops, uniform and equipment stores, and more. Many forces even run different IT systems from their counterparts, making basic information‑sharing more difficult than it needs to be.
To be fair, there has been some progress in collaboration over the past decade. Neighbouring forces increasingly share high‑cost specialist resources such as firearms, traffic and public order units. But the duplication remains huge – and expensive.
On the face of it, merging forces is an obvious way to drive efficiency and save money, particularly in the “back office”. The uncomfortable reality is that this will come with a human cost: fewer staff roles, restructuring, and the real prospect that thousands of people currently employed in policing will find themselves out of a job.
We’ve been here before
None of this is straightforward. Merging large organisations is complex, disruptive and costly, even when the end goal is greater efficiency.
This is not the first time such a reshaping of the policing map has been floated. Back in 2006, then Home Secretary Charles Clarke proposed merging the 43 forces into 12 regional “super‑forces”, with an estimated price tag of around £1 billion. The plan ultimately stalled.
Scotland provides another example. In April 2013, its eight regional forces were merged into a single service. The benefits of a national force are still debated today, but what is not disputed is that the transition came with significant pain, controversy and cost.
So while the arguments for reducing duplication are compelling, anyone promising a quick, smooth and cheap transition is being optimistic at best.
So long, Police and Crime Commissioners
One part of the current package is the proposed scrapping of PCCs by 2028. Personally, I think this is the right move.
I have never been convinced of the wisdom of inserting a politically‑motivated figurehead between the Home Office and operational policing. In too many cases, PCCs have blurred the line between governance and interference, and it is hard to point to many tangible benefits that could not have been achieved through existing oversight mechanisms.
I suspect few within policing will shed many tears when PCCs disappear.
What happens next?
The government has so far been vague on the detail and the sequencing, but a plausible target appears to be full mergers and integration by the end of the decade, around 2030.
As ever with policing reform, announcing the vision is the easy bit. The real test will be whether ministers can deliver the promised benefits without paralysing forces in years of structural upheaval, distracting them from what the public actually cares about: visible, competent day‑to‑day policing.
I’ll be watching with interest as these plans develop.
